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LOCAL LEGISLATION
Options Bestowed by Act.

An act which authorizes a city, county, borough,
etc., to do one of two or more things or the same thing
in one of two or more ways, is to be distinguished from
one whose operation altogether is made dependent on
the will of the people of the locality, or of some officer.
The fact that in one locality, the option may be exercised in favor of one result and in another in favor of a
different result, does not make the act local. The Act of
June 4
1879, P. L. 78, authorizes the commissioners
of a county to purchase real estate for a poor house
for the county, but not until a majority of the votes of
the electors cast in the county, recommend the purchase. The question is to be submitted to the
voters by the court
of quarter sessions upon
the petition and recomimendation of the overseers of
the poor
in the poor
districts
of
the county.
This feature of the law did not
wake it local. 'The law is in force in the county,whether the option to acquire the real estate is exercised or
not.' The Act of April 12, 1905, P. L. 142, enacts that
any township of the second class may, by a majority
vote of the electors thereof, change the system of taxa'Rose vs. Beaver County, 204 Pa. 372.
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tion for making the public roads, by abolishing the
work tax. To any township thus abolishing that
tax, the state is annually to pay 15 per cent of the
amount of the road tax collected. The fact that in one
township the voters will adhere to the work tax, and
in another abandon it, does not make the act local and
void. The Act of June 12, 1893, P. L. 451, which authorized one or 'more taxpayers of any township to
supersede a road tax, by contracting with the township
authorities for the maintenance of the roads, is valid.
It applies to all townships. The fact that in one township, in .virtue of the choice allowed it, the road tax will
obtain and in another not, does not make the act local
'and unconstitutional.! The legislature delegates its legislative power to townships' and cities, some of which
may exercise it in one way and some in another. It has
never been suspected that the possibility that two cities
of the same class might -adopt different regulations upcn the same subject, makes such municipal legislation unconstitutionally local. Hence cities and boroughs may be
authorized to make regulations for house drainage and
cesspools and for the registration of plumbers.' The Act
of May 5, 1899, authorizing county commissioners to
condemn bridges over streams which separate parts of
the county from other parts, is not unconstitutional,
because of the possible diversity of exercise of the discretion, nor because it does not apply to bridges between
counties.' The Act of May 23, 1895, P. L. 119, gives discretion to the board of revision of taxes in cities of the
second class, to cause an assessment of property for
purposes of taxation, to be made in the years intervening between those in which the triennial assessment is
'Foster Township Road Tax, 32 Super. 51.

%LehighValley Coal Co.'s appeal, 164 Pa. 44. Cf. Middletown
Road, 15 Super. 167.
lCom. vs. Shafer, a2 Super. 497.

'Stegrnaier vs. Jones, 203 Pa. 47.
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made. The possibility that the power may be exercised
in one city and not in another, does not make the provision unconstitutional.'
Legislation for One Class Only.
When classification is allowable, a law is not invalid which legislates upon a certain topic, for one class,
only, although there is in existence no corresponding
legislation concerning the other classes. Thus legislation requiring exits, fire escapes ,etc., in buildings in
all parts of the state, except cities of the first and second classes, is not unconstitutional, because it does not
cover buildings in those cities.' The power to legislate
for cities, justifies legislation confined to areas of the
state that are not cities.' Having made a classification
of cities, the legislature may legislate for. one class,
without legislating in a similar way, or on the same
subject, for other classes.' The Act of April 24, 1905,
-authorizing the creation, d.vision and consolidation of
wards in cities of the second class, is not unconstitu tional. ° The Act of June 4, 1879, P. L. 78, provides a
system of poor relief. Each county is created a poor
district but when any county embraces a city, such city
is not to be Included in the district, nor to be affected
by the act. All the rest of the county is subject to the
act. This legislation is not unconstitutionally local, because it excepts cities. The legislature has power to
legislate for cities as such, with respect to the poor;
hence it may, in legislating for non-city portions of the
state, omit to legislate for cities. So, the exclusion of
Philadelphia which covers the whole county of Phila'Jermyn vs. Scranton, 1.86 Pa. 595.
,Roumfort Co. vs. Delaney, 230 Pa. 374; Von Moschziskerr, J.
'Rose vs .Beaver County, 204 Pa. 372; 20 Super. 110.

Com. vs. Moir, 199 Pa. 534; cities

of

the

Beltz vs. Pittsburgh, 211 Pa. 561; Lackawanna

Pa. 494 (third class).
1
Pittsburgh Redistricting, 37 Super. 525.

second class;
Township, 160

162
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delphia, does not make the legislation local. If for any
reason the -area of Philadelphia city should be reduced,
or. if the area of the county should be enlarged, the
act would apply to so much of the county as transcended the boundaries of the city.' The Act of June 1, 1883,
P. L. 58, concerning the purchase of land for a court
house in counties, contains the proviso that it shall not
apply to counties containing cities coextensive with
them. This does not rake the act void because (a) the
only such county is Philadelphia and it has a special
code upon this subject. It was not necessary to repeal
this code, in order to make the Act of 1883 a general
one. (b) Even had there been no legislation for Philadelphia, the fact that city and county are coextensive,
is peculiar enough to justify special legislation for them,
and hence -an act designed for the rest of the state, could
properly exclude them.
Classification of Counties
For certain purposes the constitution classifies counties. It is competent therefore, for these purposes, for
the legislature to recognize the constitutional classification. The constitution declares that, in every county wherein the population shall exceed 150,000, the
general assembly shall, and in any other county may
establish a separate orphans' court, and that the register of wills shall be the clerk of such court. It follows
that the Act of April 13, 1887, P. L. 22 directing that
the register of wills of cQunties containing over 150,000 inhabitants, in which a separate orphans' court shall be
established, shall be -clerk of the court, and sball receive a certain salary, is not unconstitutional because lo"Rose vs. Beaver, 204 Pa. 372.
"Bennett vs. Norton, 171 Pa. 221.
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cal." The constitution directs that the compensation
of county officers shall be regulated by law, but that
in counties containing over 150,000 inhabitants, all
county officers shall be paid by salary, and not fees.
This takes from the legislature the power to classify
counties, having less than 150,000 inhabitants, for the
purpose of differently regulating the compensation of
officers in those 'counties. Hence the Act of June 22,
1883, directing that in counties of a population between
100,000 and 150,000, the officers shall be paid by salary, being a local statute regulating the affairs of
counties, is unconstitutional." It is said by Mitchell, J.,
that "classification of counties is therefore as pernissible as classification of cities, and the legislature may
determine what differences in situation, circumstances
and needs, call for a difference of class, subject to the
supervision of the courts as the final interpreters of
the constitution, to see that it is actually classification
and not special legislation under that guise. * * *Classification of counties with reference to population has
already 'been recognized by this court."" He concludes"
that the Act of June 27, 1895 P. L. 403, creating the
office of county controller in counties containing 150,000 inhabitants and abolishing the office of county
auditor
therein
is
constitutional.
He
suggests
that the constitution makes the same classification with
reference to separate orphans' courts and to the mode
"Reid vs. Smoulter, 128 Pa. 234. Having established a
separate orphans court in Luzerne county, which had over
1-50,000 inhabitants, the legislature could not abolish this court
on Luzerne's population falling below 150,000, by the separa-

tion of Lackawanna county, without providing for the performance of the duties of the court by the 'judges of the court

of

common pleas.
"McCarthy vs. Com., 110 Pa. 243.
"But, in two of the three cases cited by him, the classifying

act was held unconstitutional.
'Lloyd vs. Smith, 176 Pa. 213.
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of compensating county officers. What relation there
is between these two subjects and that of substituting
controller for auditor, is not apparent. Paxson, J., well
said "we are aware that it does not follow that because
classification is resorted to in the organic law, the legisStatutes have
lature may exercise the same power."
been held void, as local, which authorize an owner of
land in any county of less than 500,000 inhabitants, to
appeal from an assessment," which give a right
to file a mechanic's lien upon leaseholds, in certain
cases, except in counties having a population of over
200,000 inhabitants," or which legislate concerning the
fees of prothonotaries in counties whose population is
between 10,000 and 150,0000 or wrhich authorize the
holding of a court in a city of the fifth class which is
not the county seat, when the county has a population
exceeding 60,000.2 In Davis vs. Clark, Mercur, J., remarks of classification. "It has been sustained on the
basis of pdpulation of counties on the assun-gption that
those having a small population may ultimately have
one much larger. Here the larger (i. e. counties having
.more than 200,000 people) are excluded. We cannot assume that their population will ever be reduced to less
than the number named."
Affairs of Counties.
The following have been held to be affairs of counties: the fees payable to the prothonotaries," substitu"Wheeler vs. Philadelphia, 7.7 Pa. 338.
21Scranton vs. Silkman, 113 Pa. 191.
"Davis vs. Olarke, 106 Pa. 817. The act violated the constitutional provision that no local law be -passed authorizing the

creation of liens.
'Morison vs. Bochert, 112 Pa. 322.
';Scowden's appeal, 96 JPa. 422. Paxson,

J.,

remarks

"The

act was doubtless regarded by its framers as a classification of
counties, but it is not so. Nor does any good reason occur to my

mind why there should be such classification."
"Morison vs. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322.
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tion of salaries for fees for county officers.' The Act of
May 24, 1878, P. L 133, gave to the owner of real
property in counties of less than 500,000 inhabitants
the right of appeal from any assessments from the decision of the county commissioners or the board of appeal and revision in any city of the third class to the
Court of Common Pleas. The assessment and collection
(f taxes, the receipt and disbursement of moneys is
"certainly part of the affairs of the counties. ' " Provision for the poor is an affair of the county,' as is one
for the erection and maintenance of a suitable monuraent at the county seat, in memory of soldiers and
sailors of the Civil War. " A fence law, requiring owners of land to fence it, or a law repealing a law ;equiring owners of land to fence it, deals with an affair of
a county." While a law which increases or dimiinishes
the fees which are to be paid to the register of wills,
the recorder of deeds, the clerk of the courts, regulates
the affairs of a county, inasmuch as it affects the
people who pay, as well as the officer, a law which
taxes for the state the fees received by these officers
does not deal with county affairs.' The Act of May 3,
1909, P. L. 417, requiring exits, fire escapes and other
safe guards in buildings in any portion of the state
other than cities of the first and second classes does
not regulate the affairs of counties, cities, boroughs,
townships. It imposes, argues Elkin, J., no duties on
municipal officers; does not regulate their fees, does
not require the performance of any municipal function"
"McCarthy vs. Com., 110 Pa. 243.

'Scranton vs. Silkman, 113 Pa. 191. The act being local, was
unconstitutional.
"oor District vs. Lawrence, 222 Pa. 358.
"Yohe vs. Allegheny County, 218 -Pa. 401.
',Frost vs. Cherry, 122 Pa. 417.
"Com. vs. Anderson, 178 Pa. 171.
"Raumfort Co. vs. Delaney, 230 Pa. 874.
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The Act . of April 28, 1899, P. L. 118, concerning contested lections and requiring a bond to be filed by the
contestants for the payment of costs, probably does
not, so far as a contest for the office of president judge
0
as would
is concerned, deal with an af-fair of a county,"
an act imposing upon a county a liability for damages
caused by a riot." Provisions for the extension or erection of court houses in counties, touches an affair of
counties.' The appointment of a board of reviewers of
taxes, for a county is a county affair.' The Act of May
22, 1899, P. L. 184, to provide a revenue by imposing
a mercantile license tax on vendors of goods, does not
regulate the affairs of counties. The affairs whioh it
regulates, are affairs of the state. The fact that duties
toward the state are imposed on municipal officers,
does not make the act imposing them, one affecting the
affairs of the municipality.'
Classification of Townships.
The Act of April 28, 1899, P. L. 104, divided townships into two classes. "Those townships having a population of at least 300 to the squafre mile, as shown by the
United States census, shall," says the act, "be townships of the first class. All other townships shall be
towns'hips of the second class." The principle upon
which cities are classified, is abandoned. The test is not
population, not the number of people in the township,
but the average number of people to the square nile;
density not number. Yet the classification has been approved.' Hence provisions for the election of officer
'Patton's Election, 228 Pa. 446.
A~iegheny County vs. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397.
,Bennett,vs. Norton, 171 Pa. 221.
9Blankerburg vs. Black, 200 Pa. 629.
"Knisely vs. Coterel, 196 Pa. 614.
'Com. vs. Blackley, 198 Pa. 372; Phila. Coal and Iron Co's.
petition 200 Pa. 352; Krcykwa vs. Croniger, 200 Pa. 359; Plains
Township, 16 Super. 262; Cornnan vs. Hagenbotham, 227 Pa.

547.
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e. g., the treasurer, of townships of the first class," are
valid if the second class continue to be governed as
theretofore. Th eAct of 1899 repeals the Act of June 12,
1893, relating to township road contracts," as respects
townships of the first class.' The Act of May 28, 1907,
relating to the collection of taxes in townships of the
first class is not unconstitutional.' The provision for sewers in townships of the first class, is valid." So is the
Act of April 12, 1905, P. L. 142, which legislates for
roads in townships of the second class.'
Classification of School Districts.
"There is no constitutional objection to the classification of school districts any more than to cities. Both are
included in the same clause of the constitution prohibitory of local and special legislation, and there is no
argument against classification of one that is not equally forcible against the other. But classification may become as necessary for school districts as for cities. "
School districts are made conterminous with cities, boroughs, and townships. A classification of such as are
com~posed of tile territory which composed cities of the
third class, and legislation for these of this class with
regard to the levy and collection of school taxes; the
election of members of the board of school control,' etc.,
is valid. The provision in the Act of May 23, 1874, that
m198 Pa. 372.
'Plains Township, 16 Super. 262. Krcykwa vs. Croninger,
200 Pa. 359.
'Cornman vs. Haggenbotham, 227 Pa. 547.
'Anderson vs. Lower .Merion Township, 217 Pa. 369.
'PFoster Township Road Tax, 02 Super. 51.
"Mitchell, J., Sugar Notch [Borough, 192 Pa. 349.
'Com. vs. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504.. How far the legislation
concerning the functions of school boards strictly educational in
character such as the qualification of pupils or teachers, the
grading of schools, the courses of study, might be based on the
classification, is not considered.

168

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

a school district of a city of the third class, existing
prior to that act, might elect to continue governed by
the laws under which it 'had previously been, does not
make the act local and -unconstitutional, because it
makes possible the continuance over some members of
the class, of a government different from that imposed
upon others, by the Act of 1874." The Act of May 25,
1897, P. L. 85, which provides, that taxes for school districts in cities of the third class shall be levied on assessments for city purposes, is valid." School directors
in districts identical with cities of the third class, who
-are elected under the Act of 1874 may draw warrants
upon the treasurer of the school district which the city
controller is bound to countersign in the proper ease
School districts of the cities of the third class may be
sub-classified into those formed by division of an existing city, and those not, and provision may be validly
made, as by the Act of June 1, 1887 for the compensation of one of the districts resulting from the division
by the other of them, for the acquiring by the latter of
a disproportionate amount of the school property." "The
Act of 1887," says Mitchell, J., "applies to all the
members of a distinct class of school districts, to wit,
those specially affected 'by changes in the limiits of the
boroughs with which by previous laws, they may be
conterminous. As to all such districts the act makes
certain regulations affecting, it should be noticed, not
fheir school affairs strictly so-called, but their financialbusiness, and quasi-governmental affairs necessarfly
involved in changes of property, assets and liabilities."
"Com. vs. Guthrie, 203 Pa. 209.
"'School District vs. Smith, 195 Pa. 515.
'"Com. vs. Howell, 195 Pa. 519; Com. vs. Hitchens,
Z08.

'Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349.

200 Pa.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Classification of Boroughs.
The boroughs of the state could probably be classified like iities, upon the principle of 'population, although such classification has not been attempted. The
Act of June 24, 1895, P. L. 232, distinguishes between
boroughs which have, and those which do not have
systems of water supply and of sewerage, and authorizes the boards of health in those which have to adopt'
regulations for cesspools and drainage, and for the registration of plumbers."
School Districts.
The classification of cities cannot be a'pplied to the
school districts within them. An act to establish, and
to regulate the affairs of school districts and sub-school
districts in cities of the second class, and to repeal all
local and special laws inconsistent therewith," is a local law, affecting the affairs of school districts and is
void." But, an act providing for the exclusion from the
schools of unvaccinated children in the several municipalities of the state, even if townships are not municipalities and therefore the act does not apply to school
districts in them, is not unconstitutional. It is a
health regulation, not a regulation of the affairs of
school districts, and may pro'perly distinguish between
the greater danger of contagion in the -more populous
parts of the state, and the less danger in the less
populous parts." An act providing for the adjustment of
indebtedness between any former school district, and a
new one created by the excision of a part of it and the
erection of that part into a new district, is not local."
"Com.vs. Shafer, 32 Super. 497.
',Chalfant vs. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246; Scranton Sc'ool District, 113 Pa. 176.

'Stull vs. Reber, 215 Pa. 156.
"Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349.
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The Act of May 25, 1897, P. L. 85, provides that "* * *
in cities of the third class where the school district
comprises the same territory as the city, the taxes for
school and school building purposes shall be levied on
the assessment for city purposes," is not unconstitutional, either because it is a classification of school districts, or because it does not apply to all cities of the
third class. Its affect is to produce uniformity in the
basis of taxation for school and general municipal ,purposes, on the people of the same territory. Prima facie
every school district in a city of the third class is
conterminous with it. If under previous law there are
any exceptional cases, they simply continue as before.
The act creates no new local or special results."
Affairs of School Districts.
The Act of May 4, 1876, which required the school
directors of Ayr township to levy a tax, in order to reimburse two persons, R. and N., the sum of $700, with
interest, for money advanced by them in July. 1864, to
Ipay the commutation money for nen drafted into the
service of the United States, is a local and special and
unconstitutional law regulating an affair of a township
or school district.2
"Affair," says Mercur, J., "is
well defined to be, business, something to be transacted,
matter, concern. Public affairs are matters relating to
government. It is clear that the act does profess to deal
with the affairs of the district." The election of members of the board of school contkollers, their terms of
office, the method of filling vacancies in the board, are
affairs of school districts." The Acdt of May 23, .1889,
being confined to school districts in cities of the third
class, that are thereafter incorporated, or being pre"School District vs. Srith, 195 Pa. 51-5.
"Montgomery vs. Com., 9f Pa. 125.

'3Com. vs. Reynolds, 137 Pa. 389.
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viously incorporated, that accept its provisions,
cal.

is

lo-

Legislation for Class Not Special.
When classification is pernssible. and legislation
for a class is appropriate to that class, it is not to be
regarded as unconstitutionally local,. Says Mitchell, J.,
"Legislation for a class distinguished from a general
subject is not special but general, and classification is
a legislative question, subject to judicial revision only
so far as to see that it is founded on real distinctions in
the subjects classified, and not on artificial or irrelevent ones used for the purpose of evading the constitutional prohibition. If the distinctions are genuine, the
courts cannot declare the classification void, though
they may not consider it to be on a sound basis. The
test is not wisdom, but good faith in the classification.'" So long as classification is based on difference
of municipal affairs," says Dean, J., "the question of
where the lines shall be drawn and what differences
of system shall be prescribed for differences of situation are wholly legislative. What is a distinction without a difference is largely matter of opinion * * * * *
The line -must be drawn somewhere (i. e., between the
classes of cities) and the legislature must determine
where. So long as it is drawn with reference to municipal and not irrelevant or wholly local matters, the
courts have no authority to interfere.""
Irrelevant Subjects.
The classification of cities, etc., is valid only for
the purpose of securing the appropriateness of legisla"Seabolt vs. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 318. Com. vs. Gilligan,
195 Pa. 504. Clarke's Estate, 195 Pa. 520. Stegmaier vs. Jones,
203 Pa. 47. Corn .vs. Shafer, 32 Super. 497.
"Con. vs. Moir, 199 Pa. 534. The chief executive of a city
of the second class may be a recorder, instead of mayor.
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tion, to the various classes of municipalities, not for
matters not properly municipaL. such e. g., as the practice in the courts, the rules of evidence, the rate of
interest, the estates of minors, that is, the other classes
than cities, boroughs, etc., with respect to whic~h local
and special legislation is prohibited."
The object of
classification of cities is to make provision for the municipal needs of cities which differ greatly in population. Difference in pcpulation requires difference of
corporate powers, machinery for the exercise of these
,powers, of the number, character, powers and duties of
corporate officers. A law for the application of guardians, executors, etc., for leave to sell real property in
cities of the third class, to be made to the court of
quarter sessions, would not be warranted.'
Implicit Classifications.
An act Tnay by its classification cover the whole
field of counties, townships, boroughs, cities, etc. The
Act of 1874, e. g., divided cities into three classes. One
act having classified cities, a later act may by its terms
apply only to one of the classes, e. g., to cities of the
third or of the second and the first class. But, an act
may make a partial classification of a subject, and legislate for the class or classes thus created. It may, e. g.,
make provisions for counties having between 500,000
and 1,000,000 inhabitants, making no classification of
the other counties, and no corresponding provisions for
th'em." Such an act really separates the counties described from the other counties, legislating for the
former. A law which enacts that each city of the third
class shall constitute one school district, is pro tanto a
"Ruan St. 132 Pa. 257.

9Wyomring St. vs. Pittsburgh, 127 Pa. 494.
'Yohe vs. Allegheny County, 218 Pa. 401. Cf. M~cCarthy vs.
Corm, 110 Pa. 243. Davis vs. Clark, 106 Pa. 377.

"Com. vs. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504,
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classification of school districts.' An act providing for
the reconstruction, by the county commissioners, of
bridges over a stream which is a boundary between two
counties, which are owned by a corporation or a private
person, and are used exclusively for vehicles and foot
passengers, and which have been destroyed by ice,
floc4d, etc., creates a class of bridges to which the leg.
islation is aplicable.e It is difficult to comprehend the
remarks of Elkin, J., concerning the Act of May 3, 1909,
that it "makes no attempt at classification.'"" The act
enacts that every building in this comnonwealth, other
than buildings in cities of the first and second classes,
having more than two stories, etc., shall be provided
with proper exits, for use in case of fire. It defines the
buildings to which it applies, in part by their height, in
part by their not being in cities of the first two classes.
It thus makes a class of buildings.
Effect of Special Law or Laws Otherwise General.
If a law is so conceived that it would be general,
but for the exclusion of its operation from certain localities by reason of laws special to those localities,
such law is not deemed local. The special law may be
saved from repeal by the principle that local laws are
not repealed by general laws, or the general law may
expressly state that special laws are not repealed.' The
Act of June 25, 1885, P. L. 187, regulating the collection of taxes in boroughs and townships, was not local,
because it contain&d the provision that it should not
apply to any taxes, the collection of which was regulated by a local law," the reason assigned being that the
"Seabolt vs. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 318.

"Raumfort Co. vs. Delaney, 230 Pa. 374.
'Evans vs. Philhipi, 117 Pa. 226; Sheradan

Borough,

34

Super. 639; Rose vs. Beaver Co., 204 Pa. 372; Com. vs. Reynolds,
137 Pa. 389; Bitting, vs. Com., 7 Sadler, 545; In re Henry St.
123 Pa. 346.
"Evans vs. Phillipi, 117 Pa. 226.
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local law would not be repealed even if that provision
were not in the general law.' The Act of May 13, 1887,
concerning the sale of liquors, contains the statement
that none of its provisions "shall be held to authorize
the sale of any spirituous, etc., liquors * * * * * in any
city, county, borough, or township having special prohibitory laws." The act was nevertheless valid.'
The
Act of May 8, 1899, which provides that in all proceedings to lay out or vacate a public or private roa,
the
viewers shall be three, one of whom shall be a surveyor, is not local, because it adds "the act shall not apply
tc counties having local acts inconsistent herewith."'
The Act of May 23, 1874, concerning cities of the third
class is general although it is not to displace the special
provisions of their peculiar charters, except upon their
decision that it shall. Upon the surrender or repeal of
their peculiar charters, the Act of 1874 would operate
upon all the cities of the class.' If under some laws,
some counties maintain poor houses, and take care of
the -poor, and a law is passed providing that in every
county in which a poor house is not maintained by the
county, the county shall maintain such poor house, this
law will -not be local. It will extend to any county now
having a poor house, as soon as the special law for that
county is repealed."
Effect of Coexistance of Law Appikable
State.

to

Rest

of

The existance of a valid law for certain counties of
the state, does not make valid, another law, upon the
"But this forgets the principle that a general law will
often repeal special laws, without declaring their intention to
repeal such laws; Com. vs. Macferron, 152 Pa. 244; Bruce vs.
Pittsburgh, 166 Pa. 152.
Com. vs. Sellers, 10 Pa. 32.
"Road in Cheltenham Township, 140 Pa. 136.

"Com. vs. Reynolds, 137 Pa. 389.
"Poor District vs. Lawrence Co., 222 Pa. 358.
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same subject which is by its terms applicable only to
the other counties of the state, although the effect of
the two acts is to make uniform provisions for all the
counties of the state. The county of Philadelphia had a
system of appeals from the decision of boards of appeal, to a court. The Act of May 24, 1878, P. L. 133,
gave to all the counties of the state of less than 500,000
people, i. e., to all counties other than Philadelphia, a
similar right of appeal. It was local and unconstitutional, Green, J., conceding, however, -hbat there was much
force in the consideration that the only county which is
now excluded has a system of appeal of its own, and the
Act of 1878 practically makes the right general which
was before local."
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MOOT COURT
HOPPPR vs. SLADE
Trespass for Libel-Former Reputation at a Distant Place-Justification-Act of April 11, 1901, 2 Stewart Purdou, p.
2251.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The defendant ,has published in a paper in borough X, an
article in which he stated that Hopper had lived at-borough M,
50 miles distant, 4 years before and that he bore the reputation
there, of being a dishonest man. This is trespass for libel. Slade
attempts to justify, by proof that the statement was true. He
also insists that the evidence should be heard in mitigation of
damages.
;Chylak for Plaintiff.
Lehmayer for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COHEN, H. R. J.-T'he defendant Slade, attempts two things;
first, to prove the truth of his statements; second, to have such
evidence heard in mitigation of damages. We must now pass upon these points as matters of law.
Can the defendant justify the publication because it was the
truth? In the absence of statutory or constitutional provision to
the contrary, the general rule is, that in all civil actions of
libel or slander, the defendant is justified in law and exempt
from all civil responsibility where he alleges and establishes the
truth of the matter claimed to be defamatory. The truth of the
words is a complete defense, whe'.her the words on their face
appea r to be actionable or are made actionable by reason of
special damages; and, as said by the court in Press Co. vs.
Stewart, 119 Pa. 584, it is horn-book flaw that the truth is a
defense in a civil action for libel.
But in Smith vs. Hine, 179 Pa. 203, Justice Fell said,
"When damages are claimed for injury to character, the value
of the character alleged to have been injured may properly be
considered. In such case it is character at the time of the alleged
injury that may be taken into consideration and not the character of the plaintiff four years ago for the libel of the defendant could in no way possibly hurt the character possessed
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by plaintiff four years ago. Therefor even -were the defendant
permitted to justify his publication by proof that plaintiff's
character four years ago was just as he had dlained it to be,
yet it is not that character in which we are ,interested. If the
plaintiff was at all injured it was in respect to his 'present'
character and not as to -his 'past' character."
Considering the second point of the defense, the court in
Hopkins vs. Tate, 255 Pa. 56, held that in an action to recover
damages for injury to -the plaintiff's reputation, in consequence
cl the publication of a libel, the defendant may offer evidence of
plaintiff's bad character in the neighborhood where the libel was
published, and at the same time it was published in mitigation
of damages, 'but evidence of plaintiff's bad reputation in a
neighborhood in which he lived 11 years prior to the publication is not admissable. In the case under consideration the defendant published a libelous article in community X which article is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation, but the defendant
instead of offering evidence of the plaintiff's bad reputation in X
at the time of the publication offers to prove the plaintiff's repviation in community M four years previous to the publication
of the article.
In 255 Pa. 56, Justice Mestrezat said, "A man may, with or
without his fault, have a bad reputation for honesty in the
neighborhood in which he then resides, but removing therefrom,
he may, after living -in another and distant place for several
years, -and leading an honest land upright life, acquire a good
reputation in the latter community. His character may not undergo a change, but his reputation in the two places is not the
same. Character and reputation and not synonymous terms. The
former is what a man is, the latter what he is supposed to
be. Character may be established or impeached by evidence of
good reputation. It is his reputation -in the neighborhood in
which he resides at the time the slander was uttered and not in
the neighborhood from which the party removed many years
prior thereto, which has been attacked and injured. To the extent to which his 'reputation in the former community has been
injured the is enbitled to compensation, which may be diminished
by proof of his bad reputation in the neighborhood.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
At common law, the truth of the alleged libel, could be
shown, and 'if shown was a complete defense, irrespective of
the reason for making it. "The truth of a charge claimed to be
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defamatory, is a full justification in a civil action," says Jaggard, 1 Torts, p. 522. "While the truth," says Paxson, J., "would
not have been a defense to an indictment, the rule is otherwise
in a civil -suit for damages. This is horn-book law." Press Co.
vs. Stewart, 119 Pa. 584, 602. The defendant might have shown,
under the plea of justification, that what he had stated in the
newspaper concerning the bad reputation four years before at
the M borough, was correct.
The common law in this respect was barbarous. Why should
discreditable things of a man be published, in the absence of
justificatory circumstanices? A man has a Tepulsive disease.
Must anybody be allowed for any reason, to give publicity to the
fact? A man has 20 years ago commilted a disgraceful act. He
has long repented of it. He has by good living, built up a fair and
a deserved reputation. Why is the unearthing of the fault and
its blazonry before the public to be condoned?
The Act of April 11, 1901, Stewart Purdon, p. 2251, has, we
conceive, made an important innovation on the common law. It
provides that in civil actions, the plea of justification shall be an
adequate and compllete defense, when, to the satisfaction of the
jury it is proved that the publication is substantially true and
is proper for public information or investigation, and has not
been maliciously or negligently made.
As we conceive, a true but defamatory :statement is actionable, unless found proper for public information, and nonmalicious.
In this case no explanation of the publication appears. The
only motive seems to have been to lessen Hopper's credit at his
present home, but v.,hy this lessening of credit? Did envy, or
hatred prompt it? That Hopper, who has a fair reputation in
borough X, can be gravely hurt, by publishing that at another
place four years before his reputation for honesty was bad, is
evident. In the absence of other justification than the truth of
the allegation of .bad reputation, the plaintiff should recover
damages.
Nor do we see that the -truth of the allegation should be
thought to have %anypalliating virtue. Some truths may be
wielded maliciously for the purpose of wantonly injuring others.
Why the. use as a club, of a fact, should mitigate the responsibility for the damage, fully intended, and without excuse, we
cannot see.
Though for other reasons than those suggested by the learnod court below, we affirm its judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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CAMPBELL vs. DONNELLY
Equity-Rectification of Description in a Written Executory Contract for Sale of Land--Specific Performance of Reformed Instruments--Parol Testimony-.Statute of Frauds.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Donnelly in writing contracted to convey a tract of land
with certain ,boundaries for $3,000. On perusing the writing, ;t
month laer, Campbell detected a mistake in one of the boundaries, the result of which would be to exclude from the intended purchase, an important part. This is a bill in equity (1) to
rectify the description; (2) to compel a conveyance by Donnelly, of the land, the purchase of which -Campbell had in fact
negotiated for. The court, though convinced that the alleged
mistake had been made, refused both prayers of the bill.
H. Flannery for Plaintiff.
Hendricks for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BRENNEMAN, J.- This is a bill in equity for the rectification of a description in an executory contract for the sale of
land and specific performances of the reformed contract. The
question then naturally presents itself, whether there cau be
such correction by the introductions of oral testimony, thus
varying the terms of the written agreement, and specific performances of the contract as reformed.
The courts of the various states are divided on this question,
some holding- that such relief will be given and others following
a contrary doctrine. L. R. A. 1917 A p. 594 note (d) "Under one
theory, an executory contract for the sale of real estate cannot
be reformed and specific performance of the contract as reformed decreed, especially, where the relief demanded consists of including land omitted from the written contract, or of substituting land in the contract, which by mistake described the wrong
land, McCann vs. Pickup, 17 Phila. U6, or if supplementing a
defective description, Safe Deposit and Trust Company, vs. Diamond Coal and Coke Company, 234 Pa. 100, etc." This is on the
"theory that to do so would be to charge a party upon a contract not made in writing and signed ,by 'him," which would be a
failure of compliance with the Statute of Frauds. This represents, however, the minority view in the 'United States, but, "as
a matter of strict logic there is much to be said for the minority
view * * * * * *." Clark's Equity p. 471. And this is according
to one case the view adopted in Pennsylvania.
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A number of cases were cied by both plaintiff and defendant, but a close examination of them revealed that, the exact question involved in the case at bar was not dealt with in
those cases. Most of them were prayers for specific performance,
where the contract described the wrong land, or where the land
was to be after-acquired, or where there was no correct statement of the purchase price. One, however, was cited by the defendant, involving the question of reformation and specific performance and "we will consider that case at some length.
In the case of the Safe Deposit and Trust 'Company vs. the
Diamond Coal and Coke Company, 234 Pa. 100, a cross bill wa
filed by the defendant, asking for the reformation of an executory contract for the sale of certain lands described in the
contract and specific performances of the contract thus reformed.
Mestrezat, J., held "The Act of April 22, 1856 (P. L. 533), 2
Purd. Dig 13th ed. p 1757," known as the "Statute of Frauds,"
provides in its 4th section that "all declarations * * * * of any
lands * * * * * and all grants and assignments thereof shall be
manifested by writing * * * * * or else be void." The statute re-

ouires both the consideration and subject of the contract to be
definitely defined. The land must be described in the agreement
or by reference to a plan or other matter so that it can be
identified and located, and the description must be sufficiently
definite within itself, and not require the aid of parole testimony
or be left to the future action of the same or other parties.
If the written agreement lacks any of the essentials necessary
to make it - complete contract, the statute declares it void.
He further said "we have possibly gone as far as any American state in admitting oral testimony to vary and contradict
written instruments. We have uniformly held that parol evidence
is competent to vary or contradict a writing where there is
fraud, accident, or mistake -in the creations of an instrument itself, or where there -has been an attempt to make a fradulent
use of the instrument in violation of a promise or agreement,
made at the time the instrument was signed, and without which
it would not have been executed * * * * * Wherever a written instrument fails to express the intention of the parties, by reason
of fraud, accident or mistake, the injured party may invoke the
equity jurisdiction of the court, which by the aid of parol testimony may reform it. This is the well settled doctrine of our
state."
"While, therefore, the admissibility of parol evidence, under proper limitations, to alter, vary, and even to contradict a
written Instrument in such cases, is well settled in this state, it
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has not yet been determined by this court that, the instrument
having been varied or rectified by the evidence, the court may
decree specific performance of the agreement in its varied form,
where the contract is required by the statute to be in writing. It
is one thing to alter or vary a written contract by parol evidence
and quite another to specifically enforce it in its varied and altered form."
"Where, however, the people speaking through the legislative
branch of the government have declared that contracts relating
to certain subjects shall possess certain requisites necessary to
their validity, it is not within the power nor the jurisdiction of
this court of equity to annul or disregard the mandate. Equity
corrects that wherein the law is deficient, but wherein the
statutory law has spoken, equity must remain silent." The legislature declares the manner in which or the instrument by. which
lands in this Gtate shall be sold and transferred and the courts
have no discretion in the enforcement of this statutory provision.
"It is the doctrine of this court, declared in numerous
cases, that, where a written agreement is varied by oral testimony, the whole contract in legal contemplation becomes parol."
This is well settled and established law. When he thus converts
it to parol, the statute declares it to be voidL The latter may be
the true agreement but being oral is not specifically enforcible
because the statute says so.
The court in deciding the case 234 'Pa. 100 (supra) followed
the doctrine set forth in Macomber vs. Peckham, 16 R. I. 485,
the fac's of which are similar to those of the case at bar.
The Statute of Frauds was passed with the view to' prevention of frauds and not to the perpetration of them. When one
party to a contract declares that the writing does not contain the
true agreement intended by the parties how are we to know what
is the true intent? Campbell asserts an important part of the
land was omitted and Donnelly denies it. The only evidence is
the written instrument. To enforce the agreement as Campbell
claims, might be a hardship on Donnelly and to enforce it as
it is, might be a hardship on Campbell.
Convinced though the lower court may have been that a
mistake was committed, yet it had no power to reform and
specifically enforce the agreement, because a written instrument reformed by parol, becomes entirely parol, which by
statute Is void and unenforcible. The learned court below was
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correct in refusing both prayers of the bill and its judgment
must therefore b

AF.IRMED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
A contract may be reformed for several purposes, and by
means of oral evidence. If the object of the reformation is to
prevent enforcement, the statute of frauds presents no obstacle.
A vendee, e. g. sued for the purchase money and wishing to
escape payment, may allege that the actual contract contemplated the conveyance of other land, or more land than the tendered deed embraces in its description. If he succeeds in establishing these facts, lie may be liberated from the duty of accepting
the land described, and paying for it.
But if the purpose of the bill to- reform, is not to annul the
contract, but to enforce dt in its reformed shape,, it encounters
the statue of frauds which ordains that no estate in land shall
be granted, "unless it be by deed or note in writing signed by
the party so * * * * * granting." If the reformation causes the

conveyance to operate on land not described in the deed, the
land so added to that which is named in the deed, will be
"granted" otherwise than by the deed or note in writing, signed
by the grantor. It will be conveyed in virtue of an intention manifested solely by parol.
There are equitable exceptions to the operation of the
statute. If possession had been taken, of the land to be added to
the described land by parol; and improvements had been made
thereon by the vendee, he wou:ld -have made a title, despite the
statute of frauds. But no such facts appear in the case before
us. Cf. Trust Co. vs. Coal and Coke Co., 234 Pa. 100. The judgment -of the learned court below is
AFFIIRMED.
SLOCUM vs. SLOAN
Assumpsit for Attorney's Fee--Evidene--Comparison of Services and Ability--Other Members of the Bar-Opposing
Counsel-Attorneys for the Saine Client.
STATERENT OF FACTS.
Slocum was attorney for Sloan in an ejectment ease involving the title to land worth $30,000. This is ssumpsit for
a fee. Slocum offered to show that X, another attorney in the
same case, received $4,000. JHe offered evidence that his standing at the Bar, his age, his experience were superior to those of
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X, also that the work in the case was twice as onerous and required a higher quality of ability. He also offered evidence of
the value of the land which was the subject of the controversy,
also of the reputation and ability af the lawyers on the other
slde with whom he had to contend. Defendant objected to this
evidence. The court admitted it. Verdict for the plaintiff for $7,000.
McLaughlin for Plaintiff.
Moskowitz for Defendant.
OHASE WEAVER, J.-The question in this case as both counsel
have correctly stated is, whether or not an attorney can introduce
evidence of his professional skili, his standing at the Bar and
the amount and character of work done in this suit. This seems
to be the main objection. The testimony showing the standing of
X, that is, that Slocum was very much superior, if he proved
that he be so, was admissible. It is a weal known fact that in
every profession there are certain members who stand out far
above their fellow brethren. Some lawyers may be better versed
in the law and may have a more clever way of handling their
case, in the examination of witneses, or in their address to the
jury, or in many other ways be far superior to brother members
of the same bar, and if by competent witnesses they can prove
this to the satisfaction of a jury, surely it should be admissible.
Two doctors may be qualified to perform a certain operation,
one of them has been succesful in every operation performed,
while the other one possibly has not been able to cure all. If
the people demanded the successful doctor, insisted that he oprate on them, he would be justified in receiving a higher charge
than the doctor whom people were afraid to rely on, and testimony showing his singular skill over other doctors would be
admissible.
In the case at bar Slocum could have given his opinion on
the value of services rendered, or other attorneys could have
been called in to give their opinion, Williams vs. Brown, 28
Ohio state, 47, for in an action on a bill for legal services an
attorney is an expert on the question of their value and may be
asked, considering the amount in controversy, the legal questions involved, and the inportance of the case, what in his opinion is the value of such services. Jones vs. Osgood, 57 I1. 340;
Conney vs. Campbell, 52 Ind. 157.
In Eggleston vs. Boardnm, 37 Mich. 18, the court says,
'In all cases the professional skill and standing of the person
employed, his experience, the nature of the controversy in regard to the amount involved, and the character and nature of
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the question raised in the case as well as the result, must all be
taken into consideration in fixing the value of the services rendered. Now in this case, as defendant claims if this testimony of
Sloane was not admissible, how could a jury arrive at a reasonable verdict? Possibly they could arrive at a verdict, but I
presume they would have to use a considerable amount of
imagination to do so .In a case of this kind the only way possible for the jury to reach a definite conclusion was to hear the
testimony objected to by defendant, and after hearing same cons'der it and weigh it very carefully.
In Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railroad Co. vs.
1\Wallace, L. R. A. 11, Judge Magruder practically re-affirms 37
Mich. 18, already discussed.
The value of legal services will oftentimes depend upon a
variety of considerat;ons, such as the skill of the person emp'oyed, the degree of responsibility involved in the managemlent of the cause, the time and labor bestowed. For such services there can be no established market price. There is no fixed
standard by which their value can be determined. They manitestly come within the many exceptions to the general rule that
opinions of witnesses are not evidence. I. Greenleaf, para. 440.
The adniissibility of the opinions of witnesses experienced
in such matters, for the purpose of showing the value of legal
services, was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Forsythe vs. Doolittle, 120 U. S. 73.
In Thompson vs. Boyle, 85 Pa. 477, the lower court was
reversed for not permitting practically the same kind of evidence
as was admitted by lower court in the case at bar. Another
important Pennsylvania case on this subject is Powers vs. Rich,
184 Pa. 325.
What is a fair and reasonable compensation for the professional services of a lawyer cannot, in many, if not in most
sases, be otherwise ascertained than by the opinions of members of the bar, who have become familiar, by experience and
practice -with the character of such services. Practicing attorneys occupy the position of experts as to question of this
nature. We have made a"careful review of many authorities and
of different states, and, in view of them, the evidence is admissible, and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
This is an action by an attorney, to recover fees from the
client. Such an action can be maintained in this state. Gray vs.
Brackenridge, 2 P. & W. 75, Thompson vs. Boyle, 85 Pa. 477.
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That the services were rendered, the attorney must show,
that is, their quality, and duration. He must also show their
value. The value to the client may be shown, i. e., the value to
him of the useful results of the effort. If the thing in litigation,
is a house worth $2000, the value to the client of the services,
which secure the title will not be as great, as if the house were
worth $10,000. Although the labor, skill, ingenuity, assiduity,
influence, expended in both were the same, the compensation in
the latter would be greater than in the former. "The magnitude
of the interests involved and the responsibility assumed" are
to be taken into consideration. Heblich vs. Slater, 217 Pa. 404,
410. Why this should be, it is needless now to pause to consder. It would, prima facie, seem irrelevant, what the value of
the thing in controversy was, except to the client, in deciding
whether to litigate about it. It would seem logical to make the
pay of the attorney depend on what he (lid; the skill, social influence, knovledgte of laws, industry which he expended, and
not on the result.
The court below has allowed Slocum to show that X, another attorney, in the same case, and for the same client,
charged and was paid $4,000 for his services, and to institute a
comparison between his own meritoriousness and that of X. He
argued, X got $4,000; my work was as good as X's, therefore I
should get $4,000. There are difficulties in the way of allowing
this reasoning. Did X deserve $4,000? How did he persuade
Slocum to pay him so much? Did Slocum admit that the charge
was fair? Was he mistaken 'f he did?
But, another difficulty would be, that instead of showing
what Slocum did, and the value thereof, the effort is to s'iow
how the labor, skill, fidetity, etc., of one of his atorneys compare with those of the other. This raises a collateral issue.
Slocum offers to compare his age, his standing, his experience,
the amount and quality of his labor, with those of X, an irrelevant matter. Heblich vs. Slater, 217 Pa. 404; Playford vs.
Hutchinson, 135 Pa. 426. 'We think thecharacter of the opposing attorney might be shown, for the purpose of revealing the
amount of labor, and skill, and knowledge, which were probably
expended by the plaintiff, in winning the cause.
So much of the evidence as concerned X's services and compensation was improperly' recejved. The judgment for the
p-laintiff must therefore be
REVERSED.
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PENNOCKS ESTATE

Wills Act of 1917-Charitable Bequest-Merger of Life Estate
and Remainder-Trusts--Effect of Partial Failure of Will
on the Entire Will.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Pennock left. $15,000 and appoin'ed Mills trustee to invest
it and pay the interest to his daughter, and if necessary, part of
the principal, and at her death, he gave the money remaining to
a church He died three weeks after making the will. At the
settlement of the account of the executor, Mills claimed the
money as trustee. The daughter clamed it, alleging intestacy as
to the remainder of the life estate and the uselessness of the
trust. The orphans court ordered the money to the daughter.
Herring for Plaintiff.
Kelly for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Glowa, J.-The testator, Pennock, in his will left his estate of $15,000 to be invested by a trustee and the interest to
be paid to his daughter and if necessary part of the principal.
Then at her death he gave the money remaining to a church.
The testator then died three weeks after the making of the
will, so that the gift over to the church is void by the provisions of the Wills Act of 1917, Section Six, which requires that
a gift to a charitable purposes must be made at least 30 days
before the decease of the testator.
Because of the failure of the gift to the church, the daughter now claims the corpus of the es.ate as the purpose of the
trust has falled. The trustee claims the money as trustee to
carry out the intention of the testator as far as practicable.
This court, in view of the law as laid down in Conley's Estate, 197 Pa. 292, gives the money to the daughter under the
intestate law of this state, for, as to the gift to the church, the
test ator died intestate. In that case it was held that "Where a
testator without children gives all of his estate to trustees to
pay the income therefrom to his wife during her life, and after
her death to pay one-half of the principle to charities, and the
other half to certain persons named and the testator dies within 30 days from the date of his will, the wife is entitled under
the intestate laws, 'brothers of the testator surviving him, to
one-quarter of the estate free from the trust."
In the Conley case, it was said, "As one-half of the residue
of his estate, subject to the widow's life interest is ill given;
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there is intestacy as to it, and it must eventually be distributed
under -the intestate laws." Gray's Estate, 147 Pa. 67. The title
to one-fourth vests in the widow and if the equitable life interest given her by the will merges with the title to the corpus,
she inherits under the intestate laws; it should be distributed
to her.
In Fitzgerald's Appeal, 155 Pa. 96, the Supreme Court
says: "The doctrine of -merger is well stated by Sir Win. Grant
in Forbes vs. Moffit, 18 Vesy, Jr., 390, as follows: It is very
clear that a person becoming entitled to an estate subject to a
charge for his own benefit, may, if he choose, at once take the
estate and keep up the charge. Upon this subject a court of
equity is not guided by the rules of law. It will sometimes hold
a charge extinguished when it would subsist at law, and sometimes preserve it when at law it would be merged, the question
is upon the intention, actual or presumed, of the person in
whom the interests are united. In most instances it is, with
reference to the party himself, of no sort of use to have a
charge on his own estate, and when that is the ease it will be
,held to sink unless something shall have been done by him to
keep it on foot."
Here the daughter's rights would be curtailed and her estate prejudiced if the charge of the life interest is kept alive
and distribution made to the trustee.
We think, therefore, that the gift of the income by the
will is merged with the title vested in the daughter, under the
intestate laws to the corpus of the fund, and she is entitled to
it free of the trust.
It is true the trust created by the will is an active one
during the daughter's lifetime, but as the testator is shown to
have had confidence in her business judgment by allowing her
to draw on the principal as it might be necessary, it seems to
have been created not to protect her but to preserve the corpus
for the church in remainder.
There being no necessity to keep it alive for that purpose,
the trust is therefore executed and distribution of the fund
made to her. Tucker's Appeal, 75 Pa. 254; Conley's Estate, 197
Pa. 291.
The doctrines applicable to spendthrift trusts are not applicable to the present ease, as the provision that the daughter
could have such of the principle as necessary, shows that it was
not the testator's intention to create such a trust and is incompatible therewith.
The decree of the orphans court ordering the money to be
paid to the daughter is therefore affirmed.
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OPINION OF THE SUNRME COURT.

The gift of the remainder of the estate, ater the death of
the testator's daughter to a church was void, because so far
as appears, the will was not at.ested by two credible and disinterested witnesses, and because the estator died within a month
of the making of the will.
So far as appears, the daughter is the only person who under the intestate law cou'd have taken the estate, had the
tes'.ator died intestate. WNith respect to what shall remain after
the daughter's death, he has died intestate since the attempted
bequest is void.
If the daughter owned the life estate absolutely, and also
the remainder, there would have been a merger, and she would
hav been entitled to the fund.
But, the will appointed Mills trustee With the duty of investing the money ,and of paying the interest thereon to the
daughter. He had a discretion with regard to paying a part or
parts of the principal. If we were warranted in holding that the
only purpose of creating the trust, was to secure the remainder
tc the church, we should logically conclude that, since 'be church
takes nothing, the trust fails to take effect. We cannot, however,
so interpret the intention of the testator. the daughter was,
probably, inexperienced in business, and unable, properly to undertake the investment of the money. She might, too, have unwisely consumed too much of the fund, had the discretion as to
how much should be consumed been given to her. A result
might have been that long before her death, the fund would be
exhausted and the daughter left in penury. The testator might
well have been willing to allow a discree' business man to dec'de whether the fund and how much of the fund, should be expended, and not willing to impart this discretion to the inexperienced daughter.
We cannot then, concude that the trust was made for the
preservation of a fund for the church, especially since the
trustee received the power to allow the daughter to consume
the principal.
It follows then, that the money should be given to the
truseee, to invest it, and dispose of the interest on it, and of
the money itself, if necessary, for the daughter. She can dispose of the uncertain residuum after her death at any time but
she cannot pass to an asignee the right to receive any part of
it until her death. Gourley's Estate, 238 Pa. 62.
The decree of the orphans court must be
REVE3RSED.

